Author(s)

Bibliographic Information

Comparative constitutional design

Tom Ginsburg

(Comparative constitutional law and policy)

Cambridge University Press, 2012

  • : hardback

Available at  / 15 libraries

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Note

Includes bibliographical references and index

Contents of Works

  • Introduction / Tom Ginsburg
  • Clearing and strengthening the channels of constitution-making / Jon Elster
  • Does the process of constitution-making matter? / Justin Blount, Zachary Elkins, and Tom Ginsburg
  • Democratization and countermajoritarian institutions : power and constitutional design in self-enforcing democracy / Susan Alberts, Chris Warshaw, and Barry R. Weingast
  • The origins of parliamentary responsibility / Adam Przeworski, Tamar Asadurian, and Anjali Thomas Bohlken
  • Social foundations of China's living constitution / Randall Peerenboom
  • The political economy of constitutionalism in a non-secularist world / Ran Hirschl
  • Constitutional amendment rules : the denominator problem / Rosalind Dixon and Richard Holden
  • Collective-Action federalism : a general theory of Article I, Section 8 / Robert D. Cooter and Neil Seigel
  • Personal laws and equality : the case of India / Martha C. Nussbaum
  • Constitutional adjudication, Italian style / John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino
  • Tyrannophobia / Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermuele
  • Do executive term limits cause constitutional crises? / Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins, and James Melton

Description and Table of Contents

Description

This volume brings together essays by many of the leading scholars of comparative constitutional design from many perspectives to collectively assess what we know - and do not know - about the design process as well as particular institutional choices concerning executive power, constitutional amendment processes and many other issues. Bringing together positive and normative analysis, this volume provides state of the art in a field of growing theoretical and practical importance.

Table of Contents

  • 1. Introduction Tom Ginsburg
  • Part I. Design Processes: 2. Clearing and strengthening the channels of constitution-making Jon Elster
  • 3. What we know - and don't know - about design processes Justin Blount, Zachary Elkins and Tom Ginsburg
  • Part II. How Do We Get to Constitutional Design? Constraints and Conditions: 4. Democratization and countermajoritarian institutions: the role of power and constitutional design in self-enforcing democracy Susan Alberts, Chris Warshaw and Barry R. Weingast
  • 5. The origins of parliamentary responsibility Adam Przeworski, Tamar Asadurian and Anjali Thomas Bohlken
  • 6. The social foundations of China's living constitution Randall Peerenboom
  • 7. The political economy of constitutionalism in a post-secular world Ran Hirschl
  • Part III. Issues in Institutional Design: 8. Designing constitutional amendment rules, to scale Rosalind Dixon and Richard Holden
  • 9. Federalism: general welfare, interstate commerce, and economic analysis Robert D. Cooter and Neil Seigel
  • 10. Personal laws and equality: the case of India Martha Nussbaum
  • 11. Constitutional adjudication, Italian style John Ferejohn and Pasquale Pasquino
  • 12. Tyrannophobia Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermuele
  • 13. Do executive term limits cause constitutional crises? Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elkins and James Melton.

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Details

  • NCID
    BB08712094
  • ISBN
    • 9781107020566
  • LCCN
    2011048126
  • Country Code
    us
  • Title Language Code
    eng
  • Text Language Code
    eng
  • Place of Publication
    New York
  • Pages/Volumes
    xi, 393 p.
  • Size
    24 cm
  • Classification
  • Subject Headings
  • Parent Bibliography ID
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